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How can survival strategies of resource-dependent Chinese CSO be re-conceptualized in order to narrow the 
gap between civil society research and emerging CSO practices? Specifically, to what extent have CSOs 
managed to leverage scarce resources to secure organizational survival? Drawing on Bourdieu’s scholarship 
the authors engage in theoretical innovation by explaining how CSOs have engaged in a resource 
mobilization cycle, whereby practitioners draw on their cultural, economic, symbolic and social capital. 
They explain how CSOs have varying levels of access to support their work from the four resource pools 
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The Resource Mobilization Cycle: How Chinese CSOs Leverage Cultural, Economic, Symbolic and 
Social Capital        
      
Introduction 
The study of Chinese civil society organizations (CSOs)1 is an evolving field. The opportunity for us 
researchers is to stand at the forefront and observe and analyze its evolution.2 However, we must also be 
mindful of the existing paradigms that inform, and also potentially inhibit our interpretation of this new 
social phenomena.3 Thus, at the heart of this article is our ambition to close the conceptual gap between a 
highly dynamic organizational field of Chinese civil society and research on Chinese CSOs. We posit that 
despite the proliferation of literature on ever increasing sub-sets of Chinese CSOs research on China’s civil 
society overall is falling behind changes on the ground. The following research puzzle is at the heart of our 
inquiry: How can survival strategies of resource-dependent Chinese CSO be re-conceptualized in order to 
narrow the gap between civil society research and emerging CSO practices? Specifically, to what extent have 
Chinese CSOs managed to leverage4 scarce resources to secure their organizational survival?  
 
A significant bottleneck for current research on China’s civil society lies in the theories that inform our 
work. Despite attempts to engage in theoretical innovation, academic research on the subject is currently 
impeded by the state-society paradigm as the overarching yardstick to measure the equidistance between 
China’s organized society and the party-state.5 A concentrated focus on state-society relations has led to 
 
1 In this research article we use the term civil society organization (CSO) which mirrors the Chinese-language term 
minjian zuzhi. In line with Salamon and Anheier's definition, CSOs should represent non-profit group interests, be 
anchored in values, promote solidarity and volunteerism, and enjoy some personal and financial autonomy from the 
state and private sector. See Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K Anheier, ‘The third world’s third sector in comparative 
perspective’, The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non Profit Sector Project Working Paper, (1997), p. 9. 
2 Carolyn L. Hsu and Yuzhou Jiang, “An Institutional Approach to Chinese NGOs: State Alliance Versus State 
Avoidance Strategies”, The China Quarterly, Volume 221 (2015), pp. 100-122. 
3 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd ed (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
4 By leverage we mean resource leverage which “involves employing resources in such a way as to create a maximum 
effect from a minimum effort”. See David M. Anderson, “Introduction”, in Leveraging: A Political, Economic and 
Societal Framework, ed. D.M. Anderson (New York: Springer, 2014), p. 6. 
5 Volume 19, issue 2 of Modern China, signaled the beginning of the academic interest amongst China scholars in 
understanding the (r)emergence of civil society elements in China. The articles in the 1993 issue discussed amongst 
many issues pertinent of the time, for example, the distinction between civil society and public sphere (Frederic 
Wakeman Jr, “The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture 
The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture”, pp. 108-138) or the 
existence of civil society in China, given the Western origins of the concept (Heath B. Chamberlain, On the Search for 




three possible blind spots in the academic field: 1) a disregard for the contested relationship between CSOs 
and their foreign funders; 2) a neglect of the influence of the private sector on CSOs and; 3) an 
underdeveloped understanding of the relationship between CSOs and their constituents and their grounding 
(or lack thereof) in urban or rural communities. These blind spots can only be overcome by paying greater 
attention to the practical challenges that Chinese CSOs face in terms of securing their organizational 
survival. Similarly, to Batti’s observation about NGOs operating on the African continent, Chinese CSOs 
“share a common challenge of unlimited needs chasing limited resources.”6 From a Chinese civil society 
practitioner’s perspective, the challenge of fundraising means that it can no longer be overlooked by scholars 
interested in China’s civil society development. While the political dependence of Chinese CSOs on the 
party-state is well understood, their economic dependence on their respective funders (whether state or non-
state) remains an under-investigated research area.   
 
This article synthesizes existing research on Chinese CSOs to develop a new analytical framework for the 
study of CSO resource dependency. It is structured as follows. First, we discuss how Bourdieu’s notion of 
capital can help enrich prevalent paradigms and practices in civil society research. Second, we draw parallels 
between resource-scarcity in China’s civil society sector and the challenges of resource-dependence among 
CSOs operating in other national jurisdictions. Third, we examine how CSOs have pursued the following 
resource mobilization strategy: drawing on their cultural, economic, symbolic and social capital, between 
1995 and 2017--bookended by the Fourth World Conference on Women and the Overseas NGO Law. We 
elucidate this strategy with reference to the new heuristic device of the resource mobilization cycle, arguing 
that during the past 20 years, Chinese CSOs have already experienced various iterations (and variations) of 
the resource mobilization cycle. The fourth section explains the four resource pools in which Chinese CSOs 
have varying levels of access to support their work: global civil society, party-state, private sector, local 
constituents and local communities. The concept of four resource pools builds upon Bourdieu’s forms of 
capital and existing literature on CSOs, in relation to China and beyond. We show that resource mobilization 
 
Shawn Shieh, “Remaking China’s Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era,” ChinaFile (2 August 2018), available at: 
http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/remaking-chinas-civil-society-xi-jinping-era [30 April 2019]. 
6 Rehema C. Batti, “Challenges Facing Local NGOs in Resource Mobilization”, Humanities and Social Sciences (Vol. 




from any of the four resource pools leads to different kind of political and economic opportunities and 
dependencies. Fifth, we demonstrate how the resource mobilization cycle and the four resource pools are 
applicable to the study of Chinese CSOs. We explore four CSOs sectors: environmental protection, social 
development, HIV/AIDS and migrant workers organizations. Our sixth section discusses how different 
resource mobilization strategies and capital conversion processes lead to inherent trade-offs and paradoxes 
with regards to the work of Chinese CSOs. We conclude with reflections on future research on China’s civil 
society. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s Four Forms of Capital 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction has been widely applied in the study of education and 
stratification.7 Its focus on habitus and cultural capital has made it a suitable lens through which researchers 
have tried to make sense of “class reproduction in advanced capitalist societies”.8 At the heart of Bourdieu’s 
scholarship is the question of capital, how it is obtained and used. Bourdieu writes: “Capital is accumulated 
labor…which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive basis by agents or groups of agents, enables to 
appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor”.9 The various forms of capital, whether in its 
objectified or embodied form, takes time to accumulate with the potential to produce profits, reproduce itself 
and/or be transformed into other types of capital. Here, we focus on four forms of capital: cultural, 
economic, symbolic, and social. These four forms shape our resource mobilization cycle as seen in later 
sections and in Figure 1. We briefly outline each with an eye on its application on both an individual and 
collective level. We posit that CSOs are more likely to enjoy a wider degree of organizational autonomy if 
they manage to overcome single-donor dependence. Capital accumulation―in all its forms―thus is the sine 




7 Alice Sullivan, “Bourdieu and Education: How Useful is Bourdieu’s Theory for Researchers?”, The Netherlands’ 
Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 38, No, 2 (2002), p. 144. 
8
 Ibid.  
9 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital”, in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. 
John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 241. 
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Cultural capital can exist in three different states: embodied, objectified and institutionalized.  In its 
embodied form, cultural capital are the values or characteristics that result through cultivation, such as 
education, religion or ethnicity. These values “presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation…costs 
time, time which must be invested personally by the investor”.10 On the collective level and when applying 
this to CSOs, we can think about a CSO embodying cultural capital where it is associated with certain 
cultural, social or ethnic groups or in possession of certain distinctive cultural values associated with an elite 
social level. The ability of Chinese civil society practitioners to continuously monitor and evaluate party-
state policies and practice can be considered a form of cultural capital.11 In its objectified form, cultural 
capital represents the understood value of the item. For example, a plaque awarded to a CSO for best project 
by the government only has value to one who understands the significance and rarity of such an item, 
otherwise it is just a plaque on the wall. Institutionalized cultural capital is manifested in the form of 
achieving legal registration status, successful implementation of a series of projects and programs, and 
beyond that, perhaps recognition for outstanding service awards to the community. In this context CSO 
founders have considerable power to shape the organization in their image. There are, however, in-built 
limitations to the positioning of CSOs by their leaders. If CSOs diverge too much from the norms and 
operating procedures of its primary funder(s) isomorphic pressures arise. Isomorphism in the context of 
CSOs “refers to the different factors that mold the development of organizations to a similar shape, structure 
or form”.12 At the organizational level, cultural capital is likely to be molded in the shape of the dominant 
funder’s value propositions. This can become a problem when CSOs rely on different funders. Different 
philanthropic approaches of grant-makers can put pressure on a CSO to diverge from their initial vision and 
mission.  
 
Economic Capital  
At its most basic, economic capital is money and is as Bourdieu writes, translated into property rights, its 
institutionalized form. Gregory and Howard argue that “(organizations) that build robust infrastructure—
 
10 Ibid. p. 244.  
11 Civil society practitioners need to be mindful of party policies which either constrain (e.g. Document No 9) or 
facilitate (e.g. China's Charity Law) civil society development. The authors would like to thank the anonymous 
reviewer for pointing this out.  
12 Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, “Isomorphic Pressures, Epistemic Communities and State–NGO Collaboration 
in China”, The China Quarterly, Volume 220 (2014), p. 940. 
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which includes sturdy information technology systems, skills training, fundraising processes, another 
essential overhead—are more likely to succeed than those that do not.”13 In their review of US-based non-
profits they argue that “most nonprofits do not spend enough money on overhead”.14 Civil society 
researchers thus need to pay attention to the source, volume and nature of grants that CSOs hold at any given 
time. An underfunded CSO is likely to lack the organizational capacity to live up to its vision and mission. 
Without stable funding, a CSO cannot afford office space, hire and retain staff over a sustained period, or 
ensure sustainability of its operations. A well-funded CSO, on the other hand, will be in a much stronger 
position to leverage such funding to mobilize the other three forms of capital.  
 
Symbolic Capital 
On the individual level, symbolic capital relates to a person’s class, status and prestige within a given 
community and society.15 The interlinkage between symbolic and social capital is so bounded that the 
expression of social capital is perhaps indicative of its symbolic nature. Bourdieu notes this interdependence: 
“social capital is so totally governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment that it always functions 
as symbolic capital.”16 Furthermore, he suggests that capital in whatever form can be expressed 
symbolically, and here is where we can think about the convertibility of one form of capital to another. This 
insight is important in the field of civil society research, as successful grant capture―economic 
capital―simultaneously also bestows symbolic capital upon the CSO. Here, we may also find Mayfair 
Yang’s work on guanxi particularly instructive in conceptualizing and applying the ideas of capital to the 
study of CSOs in China.17 Yang’s work on the gift economy demonstrates the types of power relationships 
and their social and symbolic expressions have manifested around the allocation and flow of desired goods in 
a politicized economy which have crystallized around the distribution and circulation of desirables in such a 
politicized economy. Yang notes that there are four basic items in circulation and “cannot be measured by a 
single objective value. Their equivalences are not systematized or universalized but remain context- and 
 
13 Ann Goggins Gregory and Don Howard, “The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle”, Stanford Social Innovation Review (Fall 
2009), at https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_nonprofit_starvation_cycle [10 April 2018]. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1984). 
16
 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital”, p. 257, footnote 17. 
17 Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
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person-specific.”18 The items in circulation are gift capital, symbolic capital, office capital and political 
capital. Gift refers to the material object such as cigarettes, foodstuffs and money. In Yang’s work, symbolic 
capital is the social investment that is accrued by the recipient and translated into a form of indebtedness or 
obligation. Office capital is in reference to positions or ranks held. And finally, political capital may be 
derived from membership of the Party and/or one’s lineage/family background whereby these positions 
translate into material advantages. There is much complementarity between Yang’s emic categories and the 
etic concepts of Bourdieu’s.19 However, where it is most useful in reflecting the overlap between the study of 
guanxi and capital is perhaps crystallized around the notion of symbolic capital, which both feature in 
Bourdieu and Yang’s work. Yang writes: “the art of guanxi aims at building up symbolic capital, which can 
be converted into usable gift capital…the art of guanxi is the crucial bridge to office and/or political 
capital…”20 While there are intersections between Yang and Bourdieu, it is worthwhile to note that there is 
distinction between the two. In Yang’s research, the bestowment of symbolic capital on to an individual, 
results in a debt or obligation, whereby the recipient is expected to repay at some point, thus creating web of 
exchanges. It is beyond the scope of the paper to delve into the differences between Yang and Bourdieu, but 
we hope that this brief discussion demonstrates interconnections, especially when seen through the lens of 
symbolic capital. The next section on social capital will show, social capital accumulation likewise enhances 
symbolic capital.   
 
Social Capital 
The idea of social capital has been more widely applied to the study of CSOs. Social capital refers to the 
trust and reciprocity that is embedded in relationships and the glue that binds families, groups and 
communities: “Social capital is the aggregated of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possessions of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the 
backing of the collectively-owned capital…”.21 Here we can see that an individual’s social capital can impact 
 
18 Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors and Banquets, p. 199. 
19 Whereas etic signifies the views and concepts of outsiders observing and analyzing a relatively distant place, culture, 
society or political system an emic perspective comes from within the social group under observation. See Marvin 
Harris, History and significance of the emic/etic distinction, Annual Review of Anthropology, 1976 5:1, 329-350.  
20 Ibid, p. 200. 
21 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” p. 248. 
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on the group or organization’s social capital. The interplay between individual and organization is critical for 
our study of CSOs, as we shall demonstrate that the social capital of the founder confers social capital upon 
their organization, thereby allowing the continuous development of organizational social capital. The 
reproduction of social networks and thus social capital requires investment and is “done through the alchemy 
of consecration, the symbolic constitution produced by social institution…”22. Through this process we see 
social capital converted into symbolic capital, whereby repeated interactions enhances the symbolic 
importance of the individual and/or organization where “they are known to more people than they know, and 
their work of sociability, when it is exerted, is highly productive”.23 This overview shows not only the 
relative importance of each form of capital but also their interconnectivity and the possibility of conversion 
of one form into another. We will expand on Bourdieu’s concept of capital accumulation in parts three and 
four. In the following we outline how Bourdieu’s four forms of capital informs our thinking on resource 
mobilization strategies for CSOs in general and Chinese CSOs in particular. 
 
Resource Constraints for CSOs 
The proliferation and diversification of civil society actors has also increased competition among CSOs. 
Salamon and Sokolowski account for the increasing pluralization of civil society actors by developing a new 
set of requirement for CSOs to be considered part of what they term the “third or social economy sector” 
(TSE).24 Such attempts to reconceptualize the third sector come against the backdrop of encroachments of 
the private sector into the civil society sphere, where increasing numbers of social business and social 
enterprises have started to compete with donor-dependent CSOs. Commenting on the global phenomenon of 
closing civil society spaces Green and Pandya have noted that CSOs are under increasing pressure from their 
 
22 Ibid. p. 22.  
23 Ibid, p. 23.  
24 Lester M. Salamon with S. Wojciech Sokolowski, “Beyond Nonprofits: Re-Conceptualizing the Third Sector”, 
Voluntas, Volume 27, No. 4 (2016), p. 1533. In this article we apply Salamon and Sokolowski’s broad definition of a 
third sector, which include a broad set of “institutional and individual activities” which “unlike the state, (…) are 
private, second (…) unlike market entities, they primarily serve some common good, and third, (..) unlike families, 
participation in them involves some meaningful element of free choice” (p. 1518). We thank the anonymous reviewer 
for pointing out Anthony Giddens’ “third way” as it pertains to civil society. We note the application of Giddens’ third 
way by New Labour under Tony Blair’s government, where there were concerted efforts to bring state and the third 
sector into an ever closer partnership to deliver social and environmental goods (see Helen Haugh and Michael Kitson, 
“The Third Way and the Third Sector: New Labour’s Economic Policy and Social Economy,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics Volume 31 (2007), pp. 973-994). 
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domestic environment as well as shrinking funding from foreign sources;25 such conditions have prompted 
donors and civil society actors to engage in strategizing for long-term survival. Simultaneously in managing 
state pressure, CSOs must also deal with increasing inter-sectoral competition for scarce resources.  
 
The situation for CSOs in China broadly mirrors the global situation. Chinese CSOs face two main obstacles 
in terms of their sustainability: obtaining registration and fundraising. Whereas the legal status of CSOs 
depends almost entirely on the willingness of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to provide political-
administrative space for non-state actors—a structural and institutional challenge—the question of 
fundraising relates to the ability among Chinese civil society practitioners to mobilize resources—a 
procedural challenge heavily dependent on the fundraising capabilities of Chinese civil society practitioners. 
However, since 2016, the possibility of fundraising has become easier with the Charity Law26, relaxing some 
of the regulatory hurdles, enabling some organizations to diversify their funding sources by raising funds 
domestically from the Chinese public.  
 
China’s civil society development has from the outset mirrored some of the features of the increasingly 
blurred boundaries between the state, private sector and civil society in other parts of the world. Civil society 
development occurred against the backdrop of a rapidly changing Chinese economy in the late 1990s. The 
emerging markets did not lead to a private sector with significant autonomy from the party-state. Prybyla has 
described the Chinese market as “quite imperfect, as they are linked by networks of interpersonal 
connections”.27 Chinese scholar, He Qinglian writes that the Chinese system of resource distribution and 
acquisition of capital and wealth is reliant on “a highly elaborate and informal network or web of social 
connections”.28 Chinese civil society practitioners therefore not only operate in a politically circumscribed 
 
25 Shannon N. Green and Archana Pandya, “Introducing Open Global Rights’ Newest Debate: ‘Closing Space for Civil 
Society’ – Analyzing the Drivers and Responses”, Open Democracy (18 April 2013), at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/shannon-n-green-archana-pandya/introducing-openglobalrights-
newest-debate-closing-s [10 April 2018]. 
26 For more information about China’s Charity Law see Josh Chin, “The good - and Bad - about China’s new Charity 
Law”, The Wall Street Journal, 16 March 2016, at https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/16/the-good-and-bad-
about-chinas-new-charity-law/ [10 April 2018] and Priscilla Son, “China’s New Charity Law”, The Borgen Project (15 
October 2016), at https://borgenproject.org/chinas-new-charity-law/ [10 April 2018]. 
27 Jan Prybyla, “The Chinese Communist Economic State”, in The Modern Chinese State, ed.  
David Shambaugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 213. 
28 Quoted in John Osburg, Anxious Wealth: Money and Morality among China’s New Rich (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 78-79. 
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environment, in which the party-state can grant or withhold licenses to operate legally, but they also have to 
mobilize resources in an environment where the Chinese party-state monopolizes resources and plays a gate-
keeping role vis-à-vis other resource pools such as global civil society, private sector, as well as local 
constituents and local communities, as we will further elaborate in later sections. 
 
According to Wang and Yao,29 resource dependence theory follows three principles. First, the pursuit of 
resources is necessary for organizational survival and fulfilment of goals. Second, resources can be obtained 
from the surrounding environment. Third, inter-organizational relationships are marked by power and 
dependency. In line with this understanding of resource-dependence, we draw upon Mitchell’s work to think 
about Chinese CSOs as “autonomy-preserving firms that intermediate between donors and beneficiaries.”30 
Similar to firms, for CSOs to secure resources exposes them to risks, whether it be the state or private sector. 
 
There is consensus in the literature that Chinese CSOs are underfunded.31 Both foreign and domestic funding 
support for Chinese CSO has been limited. Spires’ research showed that of the US $443 million sent to 
Chinese CSOs from American foundations, “government-controlled groups were the favorite of grant-
makers”32 accounting for 86 per cent of total grant monies and grassroots NGOs received just 5.61 per cent 
of the funding. Despite these figures, it is also important to note that Spires did not explore how much of the 
money that flowed to government-controlled groups was passed on to grassroots NGOs, as often they were 
unable to directly receive funds. Funding to Chinese civil society organizations from the European Union 
(EU) demonstrate similar patterns. The EU allocated 224€ million between 2007 and 2013 to support 
China’s transition to an open society, only 4 per cent of the funding would potentially benefit Chinese CSOs 
through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (1.9€ million) and NGO co-financing 
program (7.1€ million).33 
 
29 Qun Wang and Yanran Yao, “Resource Dependence and Government-NGO Relationship in China”, The China 
Nonprofit Review, Volume 8 (2016), p. 32. 
30 George E. Mitchell, “Strategic Responses to Resource Dependence among Transnational NGOs Registered in the 
United States”, Voluntas, Volume 25 (2014), p. 89. 
31 Lester M. Salamon with S. Wojciech Sokolowski, “Beyond Nonprofits: Re-Conceptualizing the Third Sector”. 
32 Anthony Spires, “US Foundations Boost Chinese Government, Not NGOs”, Yale Global Online (28 March 2012), at 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-foundations-boost-chinese-government-not-ngos [10 April 2018].  
33 “China Strategy Paper 2007-2013”, European Commission (1 January 2013), at 




Domestic funding sources for Chinese CSOs, on the other hand, are only now emerging. While local level 
experiments with government procurement of CSO services have been on-going since 2000, the Chinese 
central government only started to scale up these programs on a nation-wide level in 2012.34 Private sector 
funding for Chinese CSOs is mostly limited to CSR activities.35 Domestic foundations on the other hand, 
tend to operate their own projects and programs and only about 3 per cent can be considered grant-making 
foundations.36 Despite the growth of domestic donations to charitable courses, much of the funds are donated 
to government-organized entities, only 1.3 per cent of the donations are channeled to grassroots 
organizations37— similar to what we noted above from American foundations and the EU to Chinese civil 
society. Domestic scandals about misappropriated public funds such as the controversies surrounding the 
Red Cross Society of China in 2011 has furthermore undermined the credibility of some Chinese CSOs in 
the public eye.38 Notwithstanding the funding challenges that Chinese CSOs face, it is by no means a unique 
situation. CSOs globally have long struggled to find a balance between operating as legal entities in their 
given regional context, and not being overly reliant on one source of funding and thus being able to realize 
their organizational vision and mission without too many compromises. 
 
The CSO Resource Mobilization Cycle  
By drawing on Bourdieu’s capitals and applying it to Chinese CSOs for the purpose of understanding how 
they overcome resource constraints, we see that Chinese civil society practitioners have mobilized and 
leveraged the four forms of capital in a particular order. In the first instance, CSO founders draw on their 
cultural capital, e.g. in the form of their respective sector-specific expertise and skills when trying to 
convince their (initially mostly foreign) funders to financially support their initiatives. Successful fundraising 
 
34 Tuan Yang, Haoming Huang and Andreas Fulda, “How Policy Entrepreneurs Convinced China’s Government to 
Start Procuring Public Services from CSOs”, in Civil Society Contributions to Policy Innovation in the PR China, ed. 
Andreas Fulda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 196-197. 
35 Douglas Whitehead, “Chinese NGO–Firm Partnerships and CSR from an Institutional Perspective”, Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs, Volume 43, No. 4 (2014), pp. 41–74. 
36 Yongguang Xu, “Toward a Healthier Philanthropy: Reforming China’s Philanthropic Sector”, in Philanthropy for 
Health in China, eds. Jennifer Ryan, Lincoln Chen and Tony Saich (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 
268-280. 
37 Guosheng Deng, “The Decline of Foreign Aid and the Dilemma of the Chinese Grassroots NGOs”, Religions & 
Christianity in Today's China, Vol. III, No.1 (2013), p. 28. 
38 Voice of America, Chinese Red Cross Still Feeling Impact from 2011 Scandal, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-
red-cross-still-felling-impact-from-2011-scandal/1972844.html [30 April 2019]. 
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translated economic capital into symbolic capital, as grant capture bestows legitimacy on the CSOs’ proposed 
actions and make their organizations attractive to central or local government agencies, enables them to 
engage with constituents and access either rural or urban communities for their programs. Expanding 
networks of collaborators enhanced the CSO’s social capital. Successful projects in turn would enhance their 
initial cultural capital and their standing in the respective community of practice. The cycle then would come 
full circle and could start anew. 
 
Figure 1 HERE 
 
The Four Resource Pools  
Chinese CSOs can mobilize scarce funding from four distinctive resource pools: global civil society, party-
state, private sector, and local constituents and communities. As outlined previously, Chinese civil society 
practitioners leverage their cultural capital to mobilize economic capital, e.g. in the form of grants. Such 
funding support, however, comes with various conditions. Depending on the origin of their funding support, 
Chinese CSOs will face varying challenges in the grant-maker grantee relationship.     
 
Global Civil Society 
China’s civil society gathered steam following the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. 
Foreign funders such as the Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation, OXFAM Hong Kong, and church-based 
organizations such as Misereor provided seed funding for Chinese CSO start-ups throughout the late 1990s.39 
Although foreign funding for Chinese CSOs has always been limited, it has led to the proliferation of CSOs 
throughout China. The China Social Sector Pioneer Program (CSSP), an initiative implemented between 
2011 and 2014 by the Philadelphia-based philanthropic consultancy Geneve Global (GG) is a case in point. 
GG chose to work with 14 mostly well-established CSOs, tasked with strengthening CSO networks, 
replicating models and improving and expanding projects. Its funder, the Legatum Foundation, claims based 
on GG’s stringent reporting requirements that the CSSP has managed to improve Chinese people’s lives by 
 
39 Andreas Fulda, “The Contested Role of Foreign and Domestic Foundations in the PRC: Policies, Positions, 
Paradigms, Power”, Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies, 7, 63-99 (2017), pp. 71-72. 
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reaching out to 1,063 unique organizations through the 14 CSSP grantees.40 In this example, we see foreign 
funding expediting the development of China’s civil society sector. While indispensable in some ways, 
foreign funding has also come with major risks for Chinese CSOs. As Alpermann notes, the support of 
foreign funding is a “double-edged sword” 41 for Chinese CSOs, as it leads to donor alignment pressures 
which may raise suspicion about the CSOs in the eyes of the Chinese party-state. Moreover, given the 
suspicion non-democratic governments have of foreign organizations operating in their country—often seen 
as harbingers of political change—many, including China have sought to restrict their movement and 
operation; China’s Overseas NGO Law should be seen as an attempt to corral and limit the impact of foreign 
organizations in China.42 
 
Party-state 
China’s rapid economic growth and accumulation of wealth over the last 40 years has meant that the Chinese 
government has become a funding source for development outside its own borders43 and for its own 
domestic civil society. For Chinese CSOs this development opens a new venue for resource mobilization 
which overcomes the political risks associated with foreign funding. Simultaneously, Chinese CSOs need to 
be mindful that government procurement of CSO services has a short history and that policies guiding cross-
sectoral collaboration between party-state and CSOs are still evolving. There is certainly desire and need 
from the side of the party-state to procure services from a more skilled and knowledgeable CSO sector with 
experience in working with various constituencies, but this enthusiasm lead to impatience for results to be 
delivered which can negatively impact on the process, where analysis and assessment of projects are given 
little attention.44 Nonetheless, the party-state at the local levels, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen, has 
dedicated resources procuring CSOs’ services to deliver social welfare. 
 
 
40 “China Social Sector Pioneers Initiative: China’s Rising Social Sector”, Legatum Foundation, at 
www.legatum.org/initiative/China-Social-Sector-Pioneers-Initiative [10 April 2018]. 
41 Björn Alpermann, “State and Society in China’s Environmental Politics”, in China’s Environmental Crisis: Domestic 
and Global Political Impacts and Responses, eds. J. J. Kassiola & S. Guo, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 
143. 
42 Sidel, M. (2018). Managing the Foreign: The Drive to Securitize Foreign Nonprofit and Foundation Management in 
China, Voluntas, 1-14. 
43 Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, Timothy Hildebrandt, and Reza Hasmath, “‘Going Out’ or Staying In? The Expansion of Chinese 
NGOs in Africa”, Development Policy Review, Volume 34, No. 3 (2016), pp. 423-439. 
44 Tuan Yang, Haoming Huang and Andreas Fulda, “How Policy Entrepreneurs Convinced China’s Government to 




Apart from seeking support from global civil society or the party-state, Chinese CSOs can also tap into 
resources provided by the private sector, notably business entities and wealthy individuals. Corporate 
funding support, however, can have its own shortcomings. Increasing philanthropic activities has brought 
into discussion how wealthy individuals engage with the charitable sector, whether through foundations or 
direct giving to those in need.45 Fulda has argued that “(members) of this new generation of Chinese 
foundation actors exhibit character traits that the existing political and legal conditions alone cannot 
explain.”46 Despite this emerging resource pool for Chinese CSOs, the private sector comprised of various 
stakeholders is still in its infancy and thus affects the work and expectations placed upon Chinese CSOs, the 
grantees.  
 
Local Constituents and Communities 
Another alternative to global civil society, party-state and private sector is for Chinese CSOs to mobilize 
resources from local constituents and communities. Access to this resource pool, however, is heavily 
circumscribed. As many CSOs are established by urban professionals, they often lack a clearly defined 
constituency. Only a small minority are member-based organizations. Located somewhere below the national 
level and above the grassroots level, Chinese CSOs have only recently started to pay attention to 
constituency building.47 This means that only rarely have Chinese CSO been able to make good use of this 
resource pool. 
 
Four Chinese CSOs Sectors 
The resource mobilization cycle is a useful heuristic device to better understand Chinese CSO resource 
mobilization strategies. To test it, we investigate four Chinese CSO sectors: environment, social 
development, HIV/AIDS and migration. We ask to what extent there are sector-specific particularities which 
reveal variations in the iterative resource mobilization processes. The four sectors examined below offer a 
 
45 Karla Simon, “Finding Resources for Social Development in China”, Alliance (1 September 2011), at 
http://www.alliancemagazine.org/blog/finding-resources-for-social-development-in-china/ [10 April 2018]. 
46 Andreas Fulda, “The Contested Role of Foreign and Domestic Foundations in the PRC: Policies, Positions, 
Paradigms, Power”, p. 73.  
47 Haoming Huang, Daxing Zhao and Andreas Fulda, Minjian zuzhi huanjing jiankang zhengce tuidong zhinan 
(Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing chubanshe, 2013), pp. 105-120. 
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good cross-section of the Chinese CSO landscape. The following is not a comprehensive literature review, 
nor do we seek to enumerate every single organization for each sector, but rather we seek to provide an 
examination of how the resource mobilization cycle can be used to trace civil society development in China.  
 
Environmental Protection 
The rapid consumption and misuse of resources, and lax environmental safeguards have heightened tension 
and conflicts between the state and local communities. The central government is no doubt concerned with 
the costs of environmental damage. According to Crane and Mao, the cost of air pollution alone to the loss of 
labor productivity between 2000 and 2010 was 6.5 per cent of China’s GDP per annum.48 Such a figure did 
not begin to account for water or land pollution. Thus, the huge environmental costs and their impact on 
China’s future development have enabled environmental CSOs (ECSOs) to emerge and operate with a 
certain degree of freedom. ECSOs have addressed a range of issues by drawing on their specific academic, 
technical or practical expertise, or, in other words, their cultural capital. They were able to proliferate by 
avoiding direct confrontation with the party-state over harmful economic policies. ECSOs advocacy of “light 
green” (as opposed to “dark green”) environmentalism49 also stood them in good stead with their mostly 
foreign funders. The latter could not afford to support environmental groups which would take a 
confrontational approach in relation to the party-state. The successful CSO-led and nation-wide 26 Degree 
Campaign in 2004 aimed at lowering electric consumption and production demonstrates how this self-
limiting strategy among leading ECSOs enhanced their collective cultural capital and helped raise campaign 
funding by the Heinrich Boell Foundation. The campaign’s soft approach also enhanced the participating 
environmental CSOs symbolic capital vis-à-vis the party-state. Such trust-building enabled campaigners to 
reach out to more than 100 ECSOs nation-wide. This campaign led to national policy change in 2005, when 
the central government made it mandatory for all government agencies, hotels, shopping malls and 
restaurants to set their air conditioners at 26°C.50    
 
48 Keith Crane and Zhimin Mao, Costs of Selected Policies to Address Air Pollution in China (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2015) at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR861/RAND_RR861.pdf [10 April 2018]. 
49 Patrick Schroeder, “Public Participation in Low-Carbon Policies: Climate Change and Sustainable Lifestyle 
Movements”, in Civil Society Contributions to Policy Innovation in the PR China, ed. Andreas Fulda (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 118.  
50 Ibid, pp. 98-101. 
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Social Development 
China’s welfare system remains underdeveloped. Chan, Ngok and King have critiqued the party-state for its 
“market-oriented welfare provision, the exclusion of migrant workers from basic needs, and the welfare gap 
between men and women.” 51 Zheng has consequently called for the defense of Chinese society.52 Young, on 
the other hand, notes that the CCP is not opposed to having “social forces (shehui liliang)” to undertake the 
work of the state.53 The CCP’s willingness to allow Chinese CSOs to close welfare gaps has led to a 
proliferation of social development CSOs across China. Such service delivery CSOs are focusing on the 
young,54 disabled,55 and elderly.56  
 
In terms of their resource mobilization strategies, service delivery CSOs have drawn on all four forms of 
capital (cultural, economic, symbolic and social). While the motivation for Chinese civil society practitioners 
to engage in social development work varies from utilitarian concerns about job creation to more altruistic 
motivations of putting their faith in action, they share the belief that China’s social welfare gaps can only be 
met by Chinese CSOs working in partnership with the party-state, mostly on the local government level. 
Service delivery CSOs have been able to mobilize economic capital, initially from global civil society and in 
recent years, increasingly from the party-state, as contractors of the state; as well as, the private sector, in 
terms of CSR projects or grants from China’s growing numbers of domestic philanthropic foundations. 
Furthermore, Chinese disability CSOs have begun to overcome donor dependence by marketing their 
products and services.57   
 
51 Chak Kwan Chan, Kinglun Ngok, and David Phillips, Social Policy in China: Development and Well-being (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2008), p. 217.  
52 Yongnian Zheng, “Society Must Be Defended: Reform, Openness, and Social Policy in China”, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Volume 19, No. 67 (2010), pp. 799-818.  
53 Nick Young, “NGOs and Civil Society in China”, Nickyoungwrites.com (16 February 2009), at  
http://www.nickyoungwrites.com/?q=civil_society [10 April 2018].  
54 Katja M Yang and Björn Alpermann, “Children and Youth NGOs in China: Social Activism 
Between Embeddedness and Marginalization”, China Information, Volume 28, No. 3 (2014), pp. 311–337. 
55 See Andreas Fulda, Andrea Lane and Francesco Valente, “Disability Groups Turn to the Social Enterprise Model: A 
New Trajectory?”, in Civil Society Contributions to Policy Innovation in the PR China, ed. Andreas Fulda (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 151-172 and Stephen Hallett, “‘Enabling the Disabled’: The Growing Role of Civil 
Society in Disability Rights Advocacy”, in Civil Society Contributions to Policy Innovation in the PR China, ed. 
Andreas Fulda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 173-195.  
56 Yijia Jing and Chunrong Liu, “Understanding China’s Administrative Adaptation: The Role of Weak Organizations”, 
Issues and Studies, Volume 46, No. 2 (2010), pp. 1-32.  





Despite their proximity to the grassroots level, even social service delivery CSOs have struggled to draw on 
the fourth resource pool of local communities. While the Charity Law will create new venues for licensed 
Chinese CSOs to raise funds from the public, one structural obstacle is unlikely to disappear. According to 
Bray, the notion of community correlated “to existing grassroots administrative units demarcated by the 
government.” 58 Hence, when Chinese CSOs access either local rural or urban communities, they compete 
with party-state controlled Village Committees or urban Community Residence Committees. The latter tend 
to see CSOs as competitors in the quest to win the hearts and minds of Chinese people. Consequently, 
service delivery CSOs tend to de-emphasize their own contributions to social development and attribute their 
successes to their local government partners instead.59 This strategic approach ensures access to rural and 
urban communities and in turn enhances their social capital in the form of functioning partnerships with local 
government agencies.  
 
HIV/AIDS 
HIV/AIDS CSOs in China and their access to various forms of capital are, like many other types of CSOs, 
affected by changing government policies, but two factors are unique to the issue of HIV/AIDS. The first is 
the role of HIV/AIDS CSOs working with specific sub-population groups, such as sex workers, drug users, 
men who have sex with men and infected blood donors.60 Kaufman argues that the criminalization of sex 
work in China is a great hindrance for CSOs to conduct their work, particularly in the area of HIV 
prevention.61 While government attitudes have started to change with regards to HIV/AIDS, CSOs such as 
those continuing to work with sub-population groups are not only hampered by slow-to-change attitudes, but 
also by their poor social capital.62 This poor social capital is illustrated in the trust levels between HIV/AIDS 
 
58 David Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 182.  
59 See Andreas Fulda, Yanyan Li, Qinghua Song, “New Strategies of Civil Society in China: A Case Study of the 
Network Governance Approach”, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 21, No. 76 (2012), pp. 675-693 and 
Timothy Hildebrandt, Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013).  
60 Hua Xu, Yi Zeng, and Allen F. Anderson, “Chinese NGOs in Action against HIV/AIDS”, Cell Research, Volume 15, 
No. 11–12 (2005), pp. 914–918. 
61 Joan Kaufman, “HIV, Sex Work, and Civil Society in China”. Journal of Infectious Disease, Volume 204, Suppl 5 
(2011), pp. s1218–s1222. 
62 Joseph Lau, C. Lin, Chun Hao, X. Wu, and J. Gu (2011), “Public Health Challenge of the Emerging HIV Epidemic 
Among Men who have Sex with Men in China”, Public Health, Volume 125, No. 5 (2011), pp. 260–265. 
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CSOs and the local state. Hsu in her paper on the collaboration and avoidance strategies of HIV/AIDS note 
that there is low level of institutional trust towards HIV/AIDS CSOs, and this lack of trust is considered a 
difficult barrier for CSOs to overcome when addressing HIV/AIDS or other public health issues.63 
Furthermore, Hsu’s research demonstrates that to counter this low institutional trust, many HIV/AIDS CSOs 
are making active efforts to build their social capital and networks with the authorities. One of the key 
challenges for HIV/AIDS CSOs has been to accumulate both social and cultural capital which would enable 
them to seek funding from the party-state or the private sector. In the absence of access to these two resource 
pools, many organizations have had to rely exclusively on funding support from global civil society.  
 
The second factor that is different for HIV/AIDS CSOs in comparison to other sectors, is the international 
linkages and partnerships developed to combat the impact of HIV/AIDS. Gu and Renwick echo this call, 
writing “the fight against HIV/AIDS can only be successful if there is full engagement between government, 
civil society, and international agencies.”64 According to Kaufmann, Chinese CSOs are more effective in 
advocating and impacting change when connected to global civil society actors.65 The economic capital 
received from international sources gives CSOs greater ability to acquire experience and skill sets from their 
international counterparts. This acquisition of skills and qualifications for an organization, all contributes to 
its cultural capital. Successful grant capture of HIV/AIDS CSOs is of crucial importance, as it enhances the 
organization’s symbolic capital and helps expand its social capital.  
 
Despite the economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital coming from international sources, led by the 
Global Fund, the withdrawal of the Fund from China at the end of 2013 throws an interesting dimension to 
our study of capital formation. According to Avert, nearly all of HIV/AIDS programing in China are now 
funded by the state.66 With party-state funding, we can anticipate greater need for HIV/AIDS CSOs to build, 
maintain and/or strengthen their relationship with the party-state. The initial economic capital that many 
 
63 Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, “Strategic Collaboration and Avoidance in State-NGO Relations”, Paper presented at ARNOVA 
annual meeting, Chicago, IL, 19-21 November 2015. 
64 Jing Gu and Neil Renwick, “China’s fight against HIV/AIDS”, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 17, No. 54 
(2008), p. 100. 
65 Joan Kaufman, “China’s Evolving AIDS Policy: The Influence of Global Norms and Transnational Non-
Governmental Organizations”, Contemporary Politics, Volume 18, No. 2 (2012), pp. 225–238. 
66 “HIV/AIDS in China”, Avert, June 26 2017 at https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/asia-
pacific/china [10 April 2018]. 
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HIV/AIDS CSOs were able to capitalize on from their international counterparts has enabled many to 
translate this to cultural capital. For example, the founder of AIDS Care China, Thomas Cai, has translated 
the cultural and economic capital to further the linkages that he and his organization has developed with 
international partners. Cai’s participation in a 2016 UK organized conference, Sweating Our Assets67, 
demonstrates the translation of the previous two capitals into symbolic and social capital, bestowing further 
legitimacy upon him and his CSO. Our exploration of migrant CSOs in some ways contrast against the 
experiences of HIV/AIDS CSOs and their access to capital, as we shall see next. 
 
Migration 
The emergence of migrant groups and organizations in China’s urban areas is largely due to the lack of 
social provision by urban authorities and the hukou (household registration), where entitlements from the 
state are tied to an individual’s registration.68 The influx of migrant laborers in to China’s wealthy coastal 
areas has led to sharp tensions between urban and rural residents. This category of CSOs often include two 
related CSOs: those focused on labor rights, and those focused on welfare provision to migrant workers. 
While we focus predominantly on the latter type of CSOs—those servicing migrant workers—labor CSOs 
have experienced greater state repression than migrant CSOs which has therefore impacted on their ability to 
build networks with the state.69 Unlike HIV/AIDS CSOs, labor CSOs have not had the same level of 
transnational activism because of close state monitoring, despite the fact that labor rights is often at the 
forefront of global social movements. 
 
Migrant CSOs are challenging the current urban citizenship regime.70 The state’s move to encourage greater 
CSO service delivery has helped to expand social rights to migrant workers. Ren notes that despite the 
legalistic approach of CSOs, the different legal aid programs have empowered migrant workers by raising 
 
67 “Thomas Cai”, Bond, at https://www.bond.org.uk/person/thomas-cai [10 April 2018]. 
68 “Outdated ‘Urban Passports’ Still Rule the Lives of China’s Rural Citizens”, The Independent, 13 January 2017 at  
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/outdated-urban-passports-still-rule-the-lives-of-china-s-rural-
citizens-a7517181.html [11 April 2018]. 
69 Chun-yi Lee, “Growing or Perishing? The Development of Labour NGOs”, in Civil Society Contributions to Policy 
Innovation in the PR China, ed. Andreas Fulda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 125-150. 
70 Xuefei Ren, “Dancing with the State: Migrant Workers, NGOs, and the Remaking of Urban Citizenship in China”, in 
Remaking Urban Citizenship: Organizations, Institutions, and the Right to the City, eds, Michael P. Smith & Michael 
McQuarrie (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011), pp. 99-109. 
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their rights awareness, and by fostering a sense of collective identity. Similar to the other sectors noted 
above, the initial economic capital came from foreign sources, such as OXFAM Hong Kong, international 
development and intergovernmental agencies. The seed funding many migrant CSOs received has helped the 
development of symbolic capital, expanding their network of collaborators and thereby enhancing their 
organizational skill set or, cultural capital. As indicated above, the move towards government procurement 
of CSOs’ services, enables many of these migrant CSOs with institutional history—as denoted in their 
accumulation of the four forms of capital—to be better positioned to compete for contracts. The move 
towards social service outsourcing 71 has greatly enhanced the economic capital formation opportunities of 
migrant CSOs by becoming contractors of the state. Hsu’s research on migrant CSOs demonstrates that some 
organizations have actively altered their focus and mission, to ensure greater ease in registering and therefore 
bidding for contracts.72 In so doing, migrant CSOs have sought to work hard building not only their social 
but cultural capital, to demonstrate to the state they are a model of good practice.  
 
Discussion  
The four sectors examined above shows that Chinese CSOs start with different sets of capital but can convert 
their starting capital into different forms to assist further expansion of their work. Accessing the four 
resource pools requires Chinese CSOs to align “their programming to suit donor preferences”73. As donor 
preferences differ across the resource pools, Chinese civil society practitioners face many trade-offs in their 
resource mobilization strategies. Specific trade-offs range from the political costs of securing legal status to 
inherent contradictions when trying to reduce single donor dependency and enhancing organizational 
sustainability by diversifying revenue streams. 
 
As CSOs work to gain economic capital, the desire to develop other forms of capital may necessitate closer 
relationship with the party-state. Chinese CSO practitioners need to be mindful that when their organizations 
 
71 See Jennifer Y.J. Hsu and Reza Hasmath, “A Maturing Civil Society in China? The Role of Knowledge and 
Professionalization in the Development of Chinese NGOs”, China Information, Volume 31, Issue 1 (2014), pp. 22-42 
and Karla Simon and Jessica Teets, “Revolutionizing Social Service Delivery in China: The New Policy of Contracting 
Out to Non-Profit Organizations”, International Journal of Civil Society Law, Volume 12, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1-40.  
72 Jennifer Y.J. Hsu, State of Exchange: Migrant NGOs and the Chinese Government (Vancouver, BC: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2017). 
73 George E. Mitchell, “Strategic Responses to Resource Dependence among Transnational NGOs Registered in the 
United States”, p. 74. 
 
 21 
become financially dependent on the party-state, e.g. in the context of government-procurement of CSO 
services, this financial dependence may politically neuter their organizations. The introduction of a CSO 
rating system (shehui zuzhi dengji) as part of the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ (MoCA) 2010 Administrative 
Measures for the Assessment of Social Organizations (shehui zuzhi pinggu guanli banfa) is already creating 
a new hierarchy in China’s third sector. Increasing numbers of municipal governments across China have 
decided to only procure services by Chinese CSOs if they have obtained the highest 5A rating.74 CSOs keen 
to access the party-state as resource pool thus not only have to muster considerable organizational resources 
to comply with MoCA’s regulations but are also incentivized to stay away from politically more risky policy 
advocacy, as it may affect their organization’s ranking. Chinese CSOs aligning themselves with the party-
state can be seen as a strategy of voluntary co-optation with the aim of obtaining economic and symbolic 
capital. In the future it will become more likely that Chinese CSOs will draw their funding either from the 
party-state or from the private sector due to restrictions placed on the entry of foreign organizations and 
funding. The over-reliance on these two resource pools is likely to impact upon the whole resource 
mobilization cycle and have a range of both intended and unintended consequences.  
 
Nonetheless, a functioning working relationship with the party-state increases the social capital of a Chinese 
CSO. A cooperative relationship with the CCP is a sine qua non for Chinese CSOs to access resources from 
the other three resource pools: corporate sector, local community and global civil society. When foreign and 
domestic funders engage in due diligence, they will almost certainly review a potential CSO grantee’s 
relationship with the CCP. When Chinese entrepreneurs choose to support a CSO, they will be keen to 
enhance brand value through CSO activities without jeopardizing their own government relations. The 
resulting corporatization of a Chinese CSO, however, may not sit well with mission-based international 
funders such as OXFAM Hong Kong or Misereor, who prefer to support constituency-based and value-
driven Chinese CSOs. When Chinese CSOs “adopt business orientations to compete more effectively against 
for-profit contractors, transforming NGOs into de facto business driven by excessive competition to neglect 
their missions in the pursuit of financial security”75 this can make them less attractive for foreign funders.  
 
74
 The authors would like to thank Dr. Katherine Wilhelm from the Ford Foundation for bringing this new development 
to their attention. 




Alternatively, Chinese CSOs can also mobilize resources from the local community. However, the four 
sectors above demonstrate that there is little engagement with the local community as a potential resource 
pool. Hsu’s work on migrant CSOs may give us an indication of what this currently looks like: migrant 
CSOs located on the outskirts of Beijing have worked with local authorities to secure premises for their 
offices and work but this is an economic transaction and to the displeasure of many local residents and 
begrudged by even the local authorities that stand to benefit economically from the rents.76 The influx of 
migrant workers into these communities is seen by local residents and authorities as bringing crime and 
disorderliness to the neighborhood. Consequently, such perceptions present substantial challenges for CSOs 
seeking to draw upon their local community as a resource, especially when their work concerns the 
integration of vulnerable social groups in local communities.  
 
Working in partnership with local authorities can be an effective strategy for social development CSOs to 
gain party-state recognition and to access urban and rural communities,77 and this certainly is a strategic 
approach many CSOs are engaged in. This is more difficult for Chinese environmental organizations to 
realize, since they are often confronted with local party-state actors supporting polluting corporations.78 
Chinese environmental CSOs are thus forced to look outside China for support. In the case of Chinese 
ECSOs, the alignment with foreign granting agencies’ policy objectives appears to be a necessity, but it can 
also be seen as a threat to CCP cadres who are part of the elites who have captured regulatory bodies such as 
environmental protection agencies and “transform them into private instruments for rent-seeking”.79 Thus, 
depending on the sector Chinese CSOs operate within they will have developed different kinds of resource 
mobilization strategies to fit their organizational circumstances. A key finding from our research is that the 
diversification of funding streams, whilst being a pragmatic CSO strategy to enhance financial sustainability 
 
76 Jennifer Y.J. Hsu, State of Exchange: Migrant NGOs and the Chinese Government, pp. 131-139. 
77 Andreas Fulda, Yanyan Li, Qinghua Song, “New Strategies of Civil Society in China: A Case Study of the Network 
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and something that influential funders such as OXFAM Hong Kong actively support,80 is not necessarily a 
panacea, as different funding sources can lead to conflicting isomorphic pressures. A persistent problem for 
Chinese CSOs remains that different funders—be it the party-state, corporations, or foreign and domestic 
grant-making foundations—are not necessarily aware or even willing to address the inherent power 
imbalance in the grant-maker-grantee relationship.81 Consequently, Chinese civil society practitioners, in 
their quest to leverage cultural, economic, symbolic and social capital, require caution when entering 
contractual relationships with their far more powerful counterparts.  
 
Our research findings also have implications for future research on China’s civil society. While conventional 
research following the state-society paradigm has primarily focused how the Chinese party-state exerts 
political control over CSOs, e.g. by withholding or granting formal registration, in this article we have 
argued that single-donor financial dependence can equally undermine the sustainable development of a given 
CSO. Our new heuristic device of the CSO resource mobilization cycle is particularly useful for longitudinal 
studies of individual CSOs. Researchers need to be mindful that resource needs will vary considerably 
throughout the CSO lifecycle from commencement at the grassroots level, to start-up incubation, to 
adolescence, to maturity and sustainable development, to stagnation and renewal, to potential decline and 
shutdown.82 This insight is important and thus a longitudinal approach to the study of CSOs will capture 
much more information as to how an organization evolves over time. In this context the second heuristic 
device of the four resource pools is particularly useful, as it allows researchers to trace sector-specific 
resource dependencies over time. Shifts in the importance from one resource pool to another will directly 
impact the development trajectory of both individual Chinese CSOs, as well as, the third sector as a whole.  
 
80 This point was made by Dr Howard Liu, China Programme Director of OXFAM Hong Kong. In Liu’s words “(if) 
they can diversify their funding streams, their resources will become more stable”. See “Thinking Strategically: An 
Interview with Howard Liu, OXFAM China Programme Director”, China Development Brief (23 March 2015), at 
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/thinking-strategically-an-interview-with-howard-liu-oxfam-china-
programme-director/ [10 April 2018]. 
81 Andreas Fulda, “The Contested Role of Foreign and Domestic Foundations in the PRC: Policies, Positions, 
Paradigms, Power”, pp. 84-87. 
82 Speakman Management Consulting, “Nonprofit Organizational Life Cycle” (2018), at 






The availability of funding for Chinese CSOs has always been precarious. For example, the Color 
Revolutions that swept across parts of Eastern Europe in the early 2000s created careful monitoring of 
domestic CSOs with foreign funding. CSOs with funding from the Soros Foundation and National 
Endowment for Democracy were heavily scrutinized by the state, fearing that these foundations were using 
domestic conduits to influence domestic stability. While such suspicions were unfounded, the recent 
Overseas NGO Law is likely impact on the economic capital of Chinese CSOs, where foreign funding going 
into China will be significantly reduced. As a result, we can anticipate that Chinese CSOs will have to draw 
on other forms of capital to convert it to economic capital, if successful will better enable their 
institutionalization. In the process, it may well be that Chinese CSOs will become more dependent on the 
party-state for contracts. However, it is also an opportunity for CSOs to further leverage the Chinese-
language internet to raise funds83 and broach the private sector in ways that they have not done before. It is 
conceivable that service oriented CSOs may begin to charge for their services to ensure long term 
sustainability. While this is not new, as Lu has demonstrated that some CSOs in the early 2000s84 were 
already experimenting with fee-for-service models, what is different today is that the role of other forms of 
capital may be utilized to justify the shift, particularly if the CSO is able to demonstrate good practice. The 
diversification of funding streams is indeed a sensible strategy as it allows to greater financial and 
organizational stability. Nonetheless, the present reality of the Overseas NGO Law restricting foreign capital 
coming into China and the lack of cohesion with local communities, CSOs are thus restricted in these two 
sectors.  
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